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COLLECTIVE DISASTER RESPONSES TO KATRINA AND RITA:
EXPLORING THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND
SOCIAL CONTROL*
LEE M. MILLER
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ABSTRACT
The goal of this paper is to explore the dynamics of one East Texas community’s responses to hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. Literature on community response to disaster forms a basis for reflections on observed local
response activities, including convergence behavior. In particular, the concept of social capital is compared to,
and contrasted with, Barton’s model of therapeutic community. Social control is a relatively unexplored element
of social capital, but one that helps us understand the development of normative frameworks, generalized trust
and the perceived legitimacy of institutions–important factors in effective community response to disasters. In
conclusion, implications for future preparedness are mentioned.

The 2005 hurricane season was a record-breaking one for East Texas.
Proximity to Louisiana made East Texas a natural destination for evacuees from
Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent flooding of New Orleans. Even as the area
was sheltering hundreds of thousands of evacuees from Katrina, three weeks later
Hurricane Rita arrived. In the 2005 hurricane season, coastal evacuation for Texas
was based on pre-established evacuation hub communities. Huntsville, Texas had
been designated the evacuation hub for evacuees from Galveston Island. The
response of this East Texas community to large influxes of evacuees from both
storms sparked this investigation of community response and demonstrated that
when responding to an emergency, a community’s “primary resource is its
predisaster social organization” (Dynes and Quarantelli 1980:347). Unlike previous
studies on community response, however, the focus here is on a community
welcoming evacuees from other places. Can the frameworks developed through
studies of communities directly involved in disasters help us understand community
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dynamics vis-à-vis groups arriving from outside its borders? Can we still speak of
altruistic or therapeutic response (Fritz 1961; Barton 1969)? Due to population
growth and concentration around the world, the potential for risk and disaster has
increased (Perrow 2007; International Federation 2004). The need for evacuation
plans that take people to other communities, out of harm’s way, has also grown. In
light of these unfortunate expectations, it becomes necessary to understand how
host communities will fare when required to shelter possibly large numbers of
evacuees, perhaps for weeks or months rather than for hours or days. This paper
attempts to provide a clearer understanding of how communities react to disaster
by discussing the concepts of therapeutic community and convergence as applied
to one case study.
As stated early on by Fritz (1961) and Barton (1969) community response is
shaped by pre-existing social organization. Barton refers specifically to the “over-all
pattern of interpersonal ties between [a community’s] members” (1969:226). If
social ties shape disaster response then social capital theory can inform a study of
community response to help us understand issues like convergence, coordination
and innovation in the context of an emergency. The idea of social capital used here
is drawn largely from Bourdieu (1983/1986), Putnam (1993), Coleman (1990) and
Dynes( 2002). It should be noted that Coleman’s use of the concept is seen as too
individualistic and rational, even though his efforts to link social capital to social
structure are useful. Dynes successfully uses Coleman’s typology to explore the role
of social capital in disasters. Elements from a single case study cannot be
generalized, but they can indicate new ways of conceptualizing community disaster
response. It will be the task of future studies to confirm, or dispel as anomalous, the
response dynamics presented here. The conclusions drawn support Dynes’ (2002)
call to incorporate the building of social capital into community preparedness
activities and programs.
Particularly in light of the grim news from New Orleans during and after
Katrina, the small Texas town examined in this study admirably met the varied and
unexpected needs of those who sought refuge here. Walker County received
recognition from the Governor’s office for sheltering vast numbers of evacuees so
well. In fact, Huntsville has been asked to welcome larger numbers of evacuees in
the official planning documents for future emergencies. The community,
furthermore, has been selected as the site of a new multimillion dollar state
evacuation shelter financed in part by FEMA. Understanding the factors
contributing to an effective response in one community can help guide the selection
of future evacuee communities and inform future emergency responses.
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Therapeutic Community Revisited
To understand community response, it is useful to refer to the classic works of
Fritz (1961) and Barton (1969) in which they describe the efforts, largely
spontaneous, to help following a disaster as a therapeutic response. Both authors
examine how communities handle disasters within their borders. For Barton,
variables include characteristics of the disaster (suddenness, randomness) and
collective variables referring to the community in which the disaster took place.
Reactions to the victims are reactions on the part of others in the same community
to their fellow citizens who have suffered losses. The current paper differs in that
it examines how a community removed from the disaster location dealt with
welcoming an influx of victims, strangers to their community. Scanlon (1992)
points out that off-site and multiple-site convergence is possible, but disaster studies
tend to focus on areas directly impacted by disasters as opposed to more distant
host communities.
Barton’s work sheds light on how any community responds to disaster, whether
dealing with its own members or caring for evacuees from another place. In fact,
Barton’s discussion of the relational pattern characteristics within a community is
very similar to the concept of social capital. By “relational pattern characteristics,”
Barton refers to “the over-all pattern of interpersonal ties between its members.”
Furthermore these social ties have an important influence on effective
communication:
“a community in which kinship and friendship ties are poorly developed in
general, for example is a big-city apartment area full of isolated people, or
a newly settled suburb full of strangers, will have much less informal
communication even about a socially random impact than one with more
dense social ties.” (Barton 1969:226)
Other disaster scholars also recognize that how a community is organized socially
prior to an event is seen to shape the reaction to a disaster.
“The social-organizational view suggests behavior is best explained as being
guided by norms embedded in roles. This is true for behavior in disaster
situations as well as behavior in ordinary situations. Disasters do not modify
the factors affecting behavior but rather create a series of tasks with which
the existing social organization of the community must cope” (Dynes and
Quarantelli 1980:347).

Published by eGrove, 2007

3

Journal of Rural Social Sciences, Vol. 22 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 4

48

SOUTHERN RURAL SOCIOLOGY

Social organization varies among communities. How people are connected and
the nature of their interactions shapes communication, access and response to
information, as well as involvement in activities. Barton describes how socially
isolated groups within a community fare in a disaster. “In a community with
‘segmental integration,’ with close social ties within social and ethnic segments but
few ties between them, a random impact can still create intense discussion and
awareness within all groups, since each has some of its members affected” (Barton
1969:226-7). Segmented integration in a community may severely reduce
communication about a disaster if the impact of the disaster is largely confined to
only one area. Communication about the disaster within the area is likely to be very
active, but a lack of ties across the community to other groups may keep the area
relatively isolated and, consequently, limit response (Barton 1969:227).
In some ways Barton’s argument that how people are connected across a
community will shape communication and disaster response foreshadows Putnam’s
(2000) distinction between bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social
capital refers to the interactions within a group that reinforce its borders. On the
other hand, bridging social capital involves interactions among groups, linking
groups to one another. Both kinds of social capital facilitate social interactions and
contribute to rapid dissemination of information and effective disaster response.
However, if only binding social capital is present in the area affected by a disaster,
as Barton’s “segmental integration” indicates, communication with outside groups
may be slow, problematic or largely nonexistent.
Barton’s model also identifies social factors influencing willingness to help
within communities. Barton (1969:261-8) refers to the influence of group culture on
people’s helping behavior by recognizing that there is a “normative mechanism” at
work. If many people in a community help, the local perception is likely to be that
people are expected to help, establishing a helping norm in the group culture
(Barton 1969:261-3). This reference to normative influence on individuals’
motivation to help is mentioned by Barton in his discussion of situational and
motivational determinants of helping when he refers to the link between individual
moral standards and the perception that others have moral standards mandating
helping behaviors (Barton 1969:269-70).
Huntsville’s response demonstrates the ‘normative mechanism’ well despite the
fact that the community examined was not directly hit by either hurricane.
Evidence of a strongly shared set of behavioral norms comes from the interviews.
When talking about what made the local hurricane response work so well,
interviewees frequently stated that “people just knew what to do,” “people didn’t
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need to be told, they just did the job.” The informal rules of conduct are transmitted
through local institutions, family and social networks. Since many people share
longstanding connections to the same institutions, a common set of rules is taught
and internalized. This common culture informs communication, organization and
response, helping things go smoothly even in unexpected situations. This common
culture confirms Barton’s ‘normative mechanism’ at work (Barton 1969:261-8).
However, there are several factors considered by Barton that do not seem to fit
the case of a community helping disaster victims from elsewhere. According to
Barton’s model, spontaneous informal response to disaster increases with proximity
to a disaster. Although Barton points out that those directly affected may have
suffered so much damage and/or injury that they are not able to assist others, those
closest to the disaster are seen as the most likely to help the victims. Barton’s model
does not explain the responses to either Hurricane Katrina or Rita seen in
Huntsville and many other towns and cities across Texas and the nation. In this
instance, these communities were far removed from the disaster, but they
nonetheless demonstrated the ability to become “therapeutic communities.”
It should be noted that time is another element to consider when examining
disaster response. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, many disaster survivors stayed
a long time in the new communities, eventually becoming new residents. However,
after a certain period of time has passed since a disaster, people’s willingness to help
begins to decline. Wolfenstein’s (1957:189-98) early exploration of the temporal
element of response describes this dynamic in detail. In the case of Hurricane
Katrina many people have been forced to resettle permanently in communities
where they found shelter during and after the storm. Almost like immigrants, they
have a different impact on a community than people requiring temporary
emergency shelter for hours or several days. Further research is needed on the
transition from disaster evacuee to new immigrant to document the process and
how these new arrivals are integrating into their new environments.
Social Capital: A Framework for Understanding Community Response
The notion that the nature of people’s social interactions can shape the safety
of their environment is not new. Jane Jacobs (1961) points out that urban spaces in
which people interact are safer than those which discourage public interaction. She
advocates multi-use buildings to bring people into and through spaces at a variety
of times of the day and night. The presence of people brings eyes and ears to public
spaces, reducing isolation and increasing safety. It is not surprising then that the
degree to which people are connected within a group or a community will shape
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how they will respond in an emergency situation. The concept of social capital
provides a useful framework for understanding community response to disasters.
As an idea, social capital has enjoyed tremendous popularity and many scholars
have adopted the concept in a variety of ways. The diversity of uses has created
confusion about the concept’s definition and therefore some doubt as to its
usefulness. What is proposed here is a composite version, borrowing from several
authors, to create a view of social capital that is most applicable to collective
disaster response.
Bourdieu offers a relatively early approach to social capital that highlights how
social ties can be seen as ‘collectively-owned capital.’
“Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition–or in other words, to
membership in a group–which provides each of its members with the
backing of the collectively-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them
to credit, in the various senses of the word” (Bourdieu 1983/1986: 248-249).
Particularly useful here is the idea that social capital is a characteristic of the
collectivity, whereas more recent treatments of social capital tend to focus on an
individual’s use of social ties and group membership for instrumental means.
Social capital facilitates productive activity and therefore helps explain why
some communities can mobilize resources better than others. Putnam defines social
capital as the “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks
that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions….”
(Putnam 1993:167) He argues that institutions that function well are found in
regions having many formal and informal organizations. High levels of social
participation by citizens in a variety of organizations seem to be the key to
institutional efficiency. “In the most civic regions…citizens are actively involved in
all sorts of local associations–literary guilds, local bands, hunting clubs,
cooperatives and so on” (Putnam 1993:97). Coleman agrees stating that “…a group
whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive trust in one another
will be able to accomplish much more than a comparable group lacking that
trustworthiness and trust” (Coleman 1990:304).
Coleman’s types of social capital attempt to identify how social relations
translate into social capital by identifying six forms of social capital: obligations and
expectations, information potential, norms and effective sanctions, authority
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relations, appropriable social organization and intentional organization (Coleman
1990:306-13). Note that Coleman’s is an individualistic, rational-actor approach
with which this author is not comfortable, but the framework he provides helps us
to think about characteristics of community that condition how individuals interact.
All of these can be directly linked to aspects of disaster response in the literature
and to the case study at hand.
A Qualitative Study
The research includes firsthand experience of the local response efforts to both
Hurricane Katrina and Rita. National and local news sources (including The New
York Times, National Public Radio, The Houston Chronicle, KUHF Houston, the
Huntsville Item and KSAM) have been monitored for storm and evacuation-related
information starting several days prior to Katrina up to the present. In-depth
conversations, ranging from formal open-ended interviews to less formal
discussions, were conducted with twenty-four representatives of the primary
organizations involved in the local response to the emergencies described here
including: local emergency coordinators, city and county government officials,
Chamber of Commerce staff, faith-based organization staff and volunteers, nonprofit
organization staff, law enforcement personnel, first responders and volunteers.
These recorded interviews ranged from thirty minutes to two hours. The
interviews were guided by a series of questions regarding the interviewee’s official
and unofficial role(s) in local disaster response activities; whether or not his/her
organization worked with other organizations and, if so, in what ways and with
which ones; and questions asking for the interviewee’s evaluation of the
effectiveness of the local disaster response. None of the people contacted refused to
be interviewed. Since all of the people interviewed were active in the emergency
response, it is possible that their evaluations of it are overly forgiving. However,
many did speak frankly about weaknesses in the plan, identifying areas in need of
improvement. Another possible element of distortion is that the interviews took
place in the months following the 2005 hurricanes (fall 2005 through spring 2006)
and may reflect clarity of hindsight. Conducting interviews during the events was
not feasible as all of the individuals contacted would have been inaccessible due to
their roles in the emergency response.
Further background information on the community and response activities was
accumulated through more casual conversations with volunteers, participants in
local organizations and community residents. All of the descriptive details of the
disaster response that are integrated into this text are from these conversations.
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The author also was a participant observer after the evacuation at emergency
management training sessions, planning meetings, and emergency simulations
during the last three months of 2005 and all of 2006. Living in the community
under study means that daily life is a form of ethnography (Lofland and Lofland
1984) and therefore participation in local organizations and culture provides a
foundation to the observations made here. To begin to understand a community we
must examine data regarding its size and composition, how its members interact,
and a comprehensive description of the institutional context.
Case Study: Huntsville, Texas
In response to the two recent hurricanes, this observer saw the community react
to emergency situations in remarkable ways. What made the aftermath of Katrina
and Rita of particular interest was that the response was not within the damaged
communities, but extended far beyond the affected areas. In the case of Katrina,
communities in every state of the nation were included. For the town of Huntsville,
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita each presented new challenges that required fast,
flexible, innovative solutions. The first task was how to house evacuees for
relatively long periods of time. State and local emergency plans were to care for
people for a maximum time period of seventy-two hours. However, people arrived
requiring emergency shelter for weeks after the storm since they had lost
everything and had no place to go. The second issue was how to shelter so many
people. The 2005 local emergency plan foresaw sheltering 1500-1600 people for
several days. Hurricane Katrina sent more than 500 (some estimates are closer to
700) evacuees, many of whom stayed weeks or months and a few have become new
residents in the community. Additionally, during Rita, Huntsville sheltered an
estimated 15,000 people–temporarily increasing the local population by more than
50%.
As in all disasters, additional unforeseen problems arose, requiring creative
solutions. For example, nearly all Katrina evacuees arrived at one time after having
spent days being shuttled from place to place on various buses. How to provide
them all with shower and laundry facilities, and changes of clothes? Many escaped
with only the clothes they were wearing. The shelter shower facilities were very
limited and there were no washing machines available. What to do with the beloved
household pets arriving with the evacuees? (Red Cross shelters prohibit animals for
health and safety reasons.)
Other problems surfaced connected to the response itself. Once word spread
that evacuees from New Orleans would be arriving in the local area, problems of
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convergence began. There were too many volunteers and too many donations of too
many kinds, all of which created additional needs for coordination and personnel.
The magnitude of the response became an additional obstacle. Problems of
convergence of this type have been well documented in Fritz and Mathewson’s
early work (1957) and more recently in Scanlon (1992), Wenger and James (1994),
and others.
In the case of Huntsville, the articulated institutional environment facilitated
the mobilization of resources possible during the hurricane responses. On a
grassroots level, Huntsville’s many churches played a critical role. They were called
upon to provide shelter, volunteers, food, nonperishable items and money. Not only
did the churches provide all of these necessities, volunteers and donations were
turned away for days after both hurricanes because of an overwhelming surplus.
In response to Katrina two of the largest churches volunteered to open as shelters
(both had been certified as Red Cross shelters prior to the storm) and, according to
one city employee, were “practically fighting to open first.” The largest shelter for
Katrina evacuees estimated that approximately 500 volunteers worked there during
the course of the evacuees’ stay. Roughly half of these were members of that
congregation, but many churches provided teams of people and numerous other
individuals signed on as well. The Council of Ministries, the local inter-church
coordinating body, divided up the tasks so that people from all churches could help
support the shelters and feed those staying in the local hotels and motels (also full
to capacity). So many people offered to work, that many were turned away as
researchers have reported in other circumstances (Dynes and Quarantelli 1980;
Scanlon 1992; Wenger and James 1994). Locally, volunteers who were not given
tasks experienced feelings of frustration.
Similarly, citizens heard that the shelters needed supplies and that the evacuees
needed clothes and many brought items to the shelters. The shelters were quickly
overwhelmed with donations, as was the local mission which provides food and
shelter to those in need year round. Radio announcements began to go out asking
people to stop donating because there was no more storage space. The Chamber of
Commerce improvised by setting up a phone bank to answer questions and to
record people’s donations. When there was a specific need, the shelters could then
contact the Chamber volunteers and they would call the person making the
donation, thereby matching supply and demand. The local volume of donations and
volunteers was higher than anyone had expected, although Fritz and Mathewson
(1957), Scanlon (1992) and others would have anticipated such a response. Because
the numbers of volunteers and donations were unforeseen, their management was

Published by eGrove, 2007

9

Journal of Rural Social Sciences, Vol. 22 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 4

54

SOUTHERN RURAL SOCIOLOGY

not sufficiently incorporated into the emergency management plan. As a result
some resources were not fully utilized. The Emergency Response Plan has since
been updated to include dedicated space, volunteer personnel and procedures for
collection, sorting and distribution of donations.
Hurricane Rita involved the entire community to an even greater degree. Only
two official shelters housed Katrina evacuees, but Rita saw twenty-three shelters
open. People were literally sheltered in all available large buildings (churches,
universities, schools, fairgrounds). Again the hotels were full to capacity. Stores
were opened in the middle of the night to allow city personnel to get what supplies
were left to distribute to people stranded on the Interstate. Once more, residents
lined up to help feed the evacuees and provide the shelters with needed supplies.
Many other communities in Texas and elsewhere reported a tremendous desire to
help people in the wake of the storms, particularly Katrina. What makes the local
situation seem remarkable is that because of the size of the town, the response
affected everyone in the community in some way. This collective behavior raises the
question of what motivates people to volunteer to help others, especially people they
do not know. Is there something in the way the community works that shapes the
collective reaction? A look at the local institutional context will provide insight as
to how people in this community are interconnected and how this affected resident
involvement in emergency response.
Community Institutional Context
Founded in 1845, Huntsville, Texas, is located approximately seventy miles
north of downtown Houston along the major north/south thoroughfare between
Houston and Dallas, Interstate 45. Huntsville is located in the Piney Woods of East
Texas, squarely in the socially and politically conservative Bible Belt. The
population of Huntsville is 35,078, more than half the population of Walker County
(61,758), of which it is the county seat. The population of Huntsville is slightly
more African American, poorer, less educated than the state averages. Twenty-four
percent of the population of Walker County was African American in 2004
compared to 12% of the state’s overall population. Other minorities, however,
represent smaller percentages in Walker County than in Texas as a whole. In 2003,
19.4% of Walker County’s residents lived in poverty compared to 16.2% of the
state’s population. The median household income in Walker County in 2003 was
$30,537, but $39,967 in Texas as a whole. Just more than 18% of the population in
Walker County held a Bachelor’s degree or higher in 2000, compared to 23.2% of
the population of Texas (U.S. Census Bureau 2007).

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol22/iss2/4

10

Miller: Collective Disaster Responses to Katrina and Rita: Exploring Ther

COLLECTIVE DISASTER RESPONSES TO KATRINA AND RITA

55

Within the state of Texas, Huntsville is well known for its two main institutions
and by far its largest employers: the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ)
and Sam Houston State University (SHSU). Texas has prisons throughout the state,
but Huntsville has an unusually high concentration of them with prison units
housing 8,300 inmates within the city limits, and 13,000 in the county. TDCJ
employs 6,744 workers countywide. The state’s first penitentiary, the “Walls” unit
where the state’s executions take place, is one of five units within the city limits.
Four additional units are within twenty-five miles of Huntsville.
SHSU (established in 1879) is part of the Texas State University System
enrolling approximately 16,000 students and employing faculty and staff of 2,500.
The presence of these two institutions characterizes life in Huntsville. Daily
rhythms are affected by work shifts at the prison units; seasons are marked by the
ebb and flow of the student population. The unusual coexistence of two very large
institutions in a small city, one emphasizing learning, research and training and the
other aimed at more explicit social control and ‘correction’ creates the context for
the current study.
Huntsville’s institutional context is further concentrated in that it is home to
only one public school district which is the county’s third largest employer. This
means that children attending local public schools know everyone in their own
grades and recognize those in the adjacent grades. The fact that the school-age
children know one another points to how members of a community are tied
together, but more important, if children know each other and participate in
activities together, their parents and other adults associated with them are also
involved and connected, even if loosely. Activities such as PTA meetings, field trips,
little league, soccer teams, football and basketball practices and games, ballet
recitals, band concerts, cheerleading and school plays involve adults in the
community and connect them to each other.
Furthermore, the local area is characterized by a large number of churches. The
faith-based organizations number approximately 80 and range from small
congregations in the double digits to a handful of very large congregations of more
than 1,000 members. While there are many, separate churches, they are all
Christian and overwhelmingly Protestant. As such they play strong, similar roles
within the community, particularly with regard to shared values and norms,
community participation and helping behavior. Sunday church going is the norm,
with many attending a wide range of other activities like choir practice, youth
groups, prayer breakfasts, mission trips, volunteer work days and bible study
groups at other times of the week. Through church membership people become
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involved with others within their congregations but because of outreach and service
activities, church membership also increases interaction with people outside of their
own congregations.
The local nonprofit sector is also active and diverse. In 2006 the Walker County
Chamber of Commerce listed 163 nonprofit organizations in its official registry
(Huntsville Walker County Chamber of Commerce 2006). Whether small or large,
these vital service, sports or social groups represent a wide array of organizations
in which community members connect with each other. Putnam (1993) would argue
that they contribute to the community’s social capital. As we will see in the
discussion of social capital below, this interconnectedness, or system of overlapping
memberships, is important to the social organization of a community and to its
ability to respond to an emergency.
The Importance of Trust
Huntsville’s and Walker County’s responses to the events were flexible and
creative in that procedures for sheltering huge numbers of evacuees, some with
special needs and/or animals in tow, were not outlined in the emergency plans in
place during the 2005 hurricanes. Despite these omissions, the response was
generally seen as effective not only by local officials, but by evacuees, local residents
and by state and national agencies. Interestingly, the response efforts in this case
were directed toward outsiders to the community. In this sense the local case is
significantly different from Barton’s model. A return to the concept of social capital
provides a broader framework with which to understand the local community
reaction. Putnam (1993) states that the civic-mindedness of community members
is linked to the effectiveness of governmental institutions because in civic
communities citizens express “greater social trust and greater confidence in the lawabidingness of their fellow citizens” (Putnam 1993:111) than those in less civic
areas. Social participation seems to help citizens trust their institutions and one
another. This general trust is based on “the expectation that others will probably
follow the rules. Knowing that others will, you are more likely to go along, too, thus
fulfilling their expectations” (Putnam 1993:111, emphasis in original). Sabel states
that trust is “the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit the
others’ vulnerability…” (Sabel 1990:1). This is not to imply that people consciously
evaluate their own or others’ behaviors, but they are less likely to question motives
and behavior if they generally trust people.
Trust helps social interaction to proceed in expected ways. When people are
interconnected and know something about each other’s past behavior or can
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reasonably anticipate what the other will do, they are more likely to trust one
another. Frequency of interaction and knowledge of others are typical elements of
life in small communities. How trust affects interaction can be seen in the use of
contracts. When people are strangers to one another, are unconnected and social
information is scarce, as is often true in a large city, some form of contract is usually
used to ease both parties’ minds about an exchange (Black 1976; Macaulay 1963).
On the other hand, in tight-knit communities (usually smaller) formal contracts are
rarely used.1
Trust nurtures reciprocity and reciprocity in turn reinforces trust. Specific
reciprocity refers to the dynamic we all experience with gift giving. If I do
something nice for you now, you’ll do something nice for me in return. General
reciprocity is the notion that if I help you when you are in need, someone will assist
me when/if I require it. Trust operates in both types of reciprocity, but the presence
of the more diffused type of reciprocity helps explain what happened in the local
hurricane response. One might expect that a relatively small community
characterized by social participation and interconnectedness would respond well to
an emergency, bonding together to take care of their own. What was observed in
the current case study was a community that rallied to help large numbers of
strangers, perhaps indicating the presence of diffused trust and a very abstract idea
of reciprocity. Several people interviewed connected this idea of general reciprocity
to religious faith. Since the presence of Christian faith-based organizations in the
community is strongly felt, the associated normative frameworks are widely shared,
and could well contribute to the more diffused sense of reciprocity.
As people are reasonably certain that others will behave in expected ways, their
behavior is likely to conform, too. The very elements that work together to create
social capital, also exert social control on the participants. Shared normative
frameworks, created and maintained through overlapping memberships in local
institutions, shape people’s interactions: prescribing and proscribing behaviors. In
fact, where there is increased social capital, we may also find relatively more social
control. Rather than limiting openness and innovation, a highly institutionalized
social environment and the social control that accompanies it appear in this case to
make innovative problem solving possible.

1

Siegrist and Cvetkovich (2000) connect trust to the evaluation of risks and benefits crucial in

emergencies. See also Earle and Cvetkovich’s (1995) extensive treatment of types of trust.
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Social Control and Legitimacy
According to Habermas (1984) the legitimacy of social institutions refers to
people’s acceptance that they are fair and just, deserving of support and cooperation.
Citizens’ views of social institutions are critical during a crisis in that it is these
institutions that attempt to prepare for, warn about, help during and recover after,
disasters. If they are seen as trustworthy, residents will be more receptive to
disaster-related efforts. New Orleans highlighted difficulties resulting from lack of
information but, more important, what seemed to hamper response efforts were
problems of legitimacy and lack of trust. Even when information and people were
in place, the communities most affected by Katrina voiced suspicion of institutions,
particularly of the institutions whose representatives were most present in the
hardest hit areas – law enforcement (Baum 2006). Ellison (2006) reports that a
recent survey of African Americans in Houston reveals a similar lack of trust that
local government would help them in an emergency.
The degree to which social information is transmitted within a group depends
on a group’s characteristics: size, types of relationships, and amount of
interconnectedness. Huntsville is a relatively small town characterized by the
interconnected personal and organizational networks of its citizens. Therefore, it
represents a community in which information – both technical and social – is likely
to be dispersed at a rapid rate. As a result, informal social control is very present,
serving as a kind of guarantee that people can be trusted. As a result authority is
usually accepted as legitimate.
Scanlon (1992) recognizes the importance of information in disaster response
by noting that “…convergence is a function of lack of information and that it can
be controlled only with carefully collected, shared, accurate
information—something the very nature of a disaster makes difficult to achieve”
(Scanlon 1992:38). Social organization before a disaster does shape response and
information can travel more quickly in a community that is characterized by
overlapping memberships, thick networks of social ties and high levels of social
capital than in communities without these characteristics. Quickly traveling
information is positive when alerting people to danger, accessing resources and
gathering volunteers and donations. However, if information travels too quickly,
convergence can become a burden.
Citing Quarantelli and Dynes (1971, 1976), Wenger and James write of
‘consensus crisis’ as the “basic agreements among the participants regarding the
goals and objectives for action. In these settings there is a leveling of social
distinctions, a present orientation, the emergence of altruistic norms, an external
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threat to the system, the expansion of the citizenship role, increased identification
with the community, and the presence of immediate and non-ambiguous problems”
(Wenger and James 1994:231-2). A ‘consensus crisis,’ or the shared understandings
about a crisis and what should be done about it, is more likely when predisaster
social institutions are viewed as legitimate according to Habermas’ (1984) concept.
These characteristics coincide with dynamics found in areas with strong social
capital.
Information spreads quickly through the many connections residents have with
one another. Most of the links are through some sort of organizational participation
or membership. Because there are so many interconnected formal and informal
organizations in Huntsville, it can be considered a highly institutionalized
environment. Given the large percentage of local population directly or indirectly
affiliated with the two main institutions, the centralized school system, a vibrant
nonprofit sector and frequent community-wide events, local residents share
memberships in local organizations and activities. The overlapping memberships
stem from the fact that so many resident families have at least one person employed
by either of the two large institutions. There is only one public middle school and
one public high school allowing the students to know nearly everyone their own
age. Church participation is another main source of connectedness among
community members. Moreover, the city offers large public events several times a
year that are typically well attended. Nonprofit organizations and social clubs
abound (Huntsville Walker County Chamber of Commerce). Emergency
management personnel, local officials and members of the faith-based community
demonstrated a clear awareness of residents’ interconnectedness, mentioning the
concept frequently in the interviews.
Although interconnectedness and interdependence can be positive elements of
social capital, they potentially can have negative consequences leading
organizations and institutions to become insular and introspective. This closure
may create inflexible organizational structures, limiting adaptability to change.
Instead, the contention here is that to some extent the rigidities of interdependence
(including the tight social control of a relatively small town) contribute to, rather
than hinder, quick adaptable responses in emergency situations.2

2

Although applied to a different context, this is similar to Dore’s (1986) concept of flexible rigidities.

See also Bianchi and Miller (1996).
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Fostering Social Capital: Conclusions and Next Steps
Social capital is generated through social participation and the collective
definition of a group or community. Therefore, actions aimed at encouraging the
collective definition of people in a given area as stakeholders in a community are
seen as important to generating social capital. Likewise, active social participation
in the community is crucial. As we have seen, the types of organization and
participation are less important than the act of collective participation.
Trust has been identified as a vital component of social capital. So we must ask
the question, can trust be produced? Both Perrow (1992) and Sabel (1990) would
likely assert that this can only be done indirectly by establishing the conditions for
trust. Sabel suggests that drawing group boundaries to identify groups, and
encouraging interdependence among group members, fosters trust within the group
(Sabel 1990:9). Huntsville is characterized by long-term relationships, a sense of
belonging or community, overlapping personal, social and business networks and
shared culture providing an example of a context that encourages trust. When this
trust is present, social institutions are accepted as having legitimate authority: an
important aspect of effective disaster response.
Given the importance of social capital, it becomes evident that emergency
planning and training models should include a wide array of social actors and social
information in addition to logistics and law enforcement elements as Dynes (2002)
suggests. Further exploration of how social capital can inform emergency
preparedness is an ongoing part of the current research initiative.
Social capital is therefore seen to facilitate effective emergency response, at least
in this community case study. Interestingly, the process of sheltering people,
although a strain on local resources, has stimulated people to become more involved
in emergency planning and response confirming Dynes and Quarantelli’s (1980)
finding that volunteers reported feelings of increased community closeness and
pride as a result of disaster response activities. Additional volunteers have formed
new committees to meet needs that emerged during the storms. Numbers at the
Red Cross training sessions were up from the previous year indicating that the
storms helped increase participation. Reports from the Houston area confirm this
trend. The number of volunteers participating in the Community Emergency
Response Team training has more than doubled since last year prior to Katrina and
Rita (Grant 2006).
According to Coleman the creation of new social capital can grow from existing
social capital or can be completely new (1990:10). Increased participation in
emergency preparedness activities bodes well for the community when another
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emergency occurs. More important, even if we are crisis free, the process of
preparing and training for emergencies increases the local ‘stockpile’ of social
capital.
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